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In the academic year 1991-1992, Utrecht University, on my initiative, 
started to offer courses in European criminal law. This initiative came at a 
symbolic moment, just prior to the entry into force of the EU Treaty of 
Maastricht
1 and the outlining of European policy in the areas of Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA). The Director of the Legal Department, Paul DEMARET, 
was aware of the significance of this development and I have been given the 
opportunity to teach this subject at the College of Europe since 1995. Since 
then, JHA has evolved into one of the main areas of EU legislation. Now we 
are again on the threshold of an important historical feat. In June 2003, the 
European Convention reached agreement concerning a draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe.
2 The use of the term “Constitution” for 
the future EU Treaty is not simply cosmetic. The realisation has dawned that 
EU integration must be embedded in a treaty document which also regulates 
the rights and duties of citizens, not just with respect to European citizenship, 
but also with respect to, for example, Justice. Where JHA is concerned, this 
result acknowledges that the harmonisation of criminal law and criminal 
procedure and transnational cooperation cannot preclude the harmonisation 
of principles of due law and fair trial. 
Despite the substantial Europeanisation of criminal law, many criminal 
lawyers are defending the achievements and typicalities of their national 
criminal law like never before. EU initiatives are assessed from the 
perspective of the national agenda and national achievements. We are still 
                                                           
1  1 November 1993. 
2 http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN&Content=.   3
too far removed from a European criminal law policy that is both European 
and enjoys national support. The core issue is therefore not how to keep our 
criminal (procedural) law national and free from European influences, but 
rather how to ensure democratic decision making, the quality of the 
constitutional state and the guarantees of criminal law in a national 
administrative model which has to operate increasingly interactively within a 
European and international context. 
In this contribution, the contours of the Europeanisation of criminal law are 
outlined and analysed. First, attention will be paid to the EC and, second, to 
the JHA. Following this, an evaluation and a look ahead at the current IGC are 
indicated. 
 
I  The EC and the Europeanisation of Enforcement in the Member 
States 
 
For reasons which will shortly become apparent, the term used within the 
EC is not the Europeanisation of criminal law, but the Europeanisation of 
national enforcement law.
3 The influence of EC law is felt through both the 
regulating effect of the case-law of the Community courts (Court of Justice 
and Court of First Instance) and through legislation (treaty, directives and 
regulations). In addition to the regulation and harmonisation of national 
enforcement law, operational European enforcement may also be seen to 
gain importance within the EC. 
 
A.  Regulating Effect of Case-law on Enforcement in the Member 
States 
 
The power to enforce Community law in principle lies with the Member 
States. That is not to say, however, that the Member States may exercise this 
power, including in the field of criminal law, with complete freedom. As early 
as the 1980s, the Court of Justice created a Community duty to enforce, 
                                                           
3  See HARDING, C. & SWART, B. (eds.), Enforcing European Community Rules, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 
1996 and DANNECKER, G., “Strafrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft” in A. ESER & B. HUBER (eds.) 
Strafrechtsentwicklung in Europa, Freiburg im Breisgau, Eigenverlag MPI, 1995, 4.3.   4
based on Community loyalty as laid down in Article 10 of the EC Treaty. 
Although the Member States retain their discretion in the use of their national 
(private law, disciplinary law, administrative law, criminal law) enforcement 
regimes, this freedom is further defined by the Court in accordance with the 
result sought. The Member States are obliged to provide an enforcement 
regime which is effective, proportionate and deterrent in nature. In this, they 
are moreover not allowed to discriminate between equivalent national and 
European interests (assimilation principle). If a Member State criminally 
enforces tax fraud it must do the same for Community customs fraud.
4 That 
these requirements also apply to enforcement, including criminal law 
enforcement, has recently been confirmed by the Court in the Spanish 
Strawberries Case. When angry French farmers persistently took action 
against fruit transports from Spain, the French police did report the incidents, 
but they were systematically dismissed by the Public Prosecutor. The 
European Commission brought a case before the Court of Justice against 
France for failure to comply with treaty obligations and the Court found in 
favour of the Commission. Community loyalty and ensuring the free 
movement of goods do not oblige a Member State to use the principle of 
legality instead of the principle of discretionary powers in the enforcement of 
Community law, but when using the principle of discretionary powers the 
Member State must also make Community interests part of the balance.
5 
 
B. Legislative  Regulation of Enforcement in the Member States 
 
Since the 1980s, the Community legislator has substantially harmonised 
national enforcement by defining normative standards (prohibitions, 
commands, duties of care) and by prescribing obligations with respect to 
controls and penalties.
6 Community directives and regulations concerning 
agriculture, fisheries, the environment, financial markets, money laundering, 
                                                           
4 Case  68/88,  Commission v. Greece, 1989, ECR p.2965. VERVAELE, J.A.E., Fraud against the 
Community. The Need for European Fraud Legislation, Deventer-Boston, Kluwer, 1992. 
5 Case  C-265/95,  Commission v. France, 1997, ECR p.I-6959. 
6 V ERVAELE, J.A.E., “Administrative Sanctioning Powers of and in the Community. Towards a System 
of European Administrative Sanctions?” in J.A.E. VERVAELE (ed.), Administrative Law Application and 
Enforcement of Community Law in the Netherlands, Deventer-Boston, Kluwer, 1994, pp.161-202.   5
etc. contain various examples of this.
7 The Community harmonisation of 
national enforcement does not yet include the harmonisation of criminal law 
and criminal procedural law, at least, not directly. After all, the choice of which 
system of enforcement to use (civil law, disciplinary law, administrative law, 
criminal law or a combination of these) in order to give effect to Community 
law in principle remains a national one. However, Community principles of 
enforcement, like deterrence and effectiveness, and harmonising provisions
8 
in Community legislation may indirectly compel the national legislator to make 
use of punitive enforcement instruments. From the moment when a Member 
State opts to enforce an area of Community policy (perhaps partially) through 
criminal law means, Community law has full effect in criminal law. National 
criminal law must take account of the substantive normative standards of the 
Community policy area in question and of the relevant obligations with respect 
to enforcement. From this point of view, Community law clearly does indirectly 
harmonise national criminal law and criminal procedural law. National criminal 
law and criminal procedural law may need to be modified where national rules 
are incompatible with Community law (negative integration). The penalisation 
of smuggling and evasion of customs duties and the penalisation of 
transporting money within the European Union are no longer compatible with 
current Community law. The incomplete or defective transposal of directives 
in national criminal law and criminal procedural law is contrary to the Treaty 
and may result in proceedings before the Court of Justice against the Member 
State and in a bar on prosecution in criminal cases. The non-recognition of 
the evidentiary value of European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) enforcement 
reports is contrary to European law rules.
9 National criminal law and criminal 
procedural law may also need to be modified because Community law must 
be enforced effectively (positive integration). Examples of this abound. Let me 
illustrate this point with the recent standardisation in the field of investments in 
securities and stock market fraud. 
                                                           
7  See Regulation No. 2988/95, O.J. (1995) L 312. 
8  For a good example, see Article 31 of Fisheries Regulation No. 2847/93, O.J. (1993) L 261. 
9 V ERVAELE, J.A.E., “Community Regulation and Operational Application of Investigative Powers, the 
Gathering and Use of Evidence with Regard to the Infringement of EC Financial Interests” in J.A.E. 
VERVAELE (ed.), Transnational Enforcement of the Financial Interests of the European Union. 
Developments in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Corpus Juris, Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford, 
Intersentia, 1999, pp.53-92.   6
The complete liberalisation of the movement of capital took a long time to 
realise in the EC. This is the reason why the EC only harmonised the services 
of stockbrokers and investment managers in a directive at the beginning of 
the 1990s.
10 In 1989 the EC had already approved a directive on the 
coordination of rules concerning the transactions of insiders.
11 As a result of 
the continuous integration of the European financial sector, including the 
mergers of stock markets, the introduction of the single currency, the 
globalisation of the securities business and the impact of new technologies, 
Community legislation was no longer adequately able to achieve an integrated 
European capital market. The 1993 Investment Services Directive underwent 
a substantial review
12 and in its wake new guidelines were drawn up 
concerning the prospectus which has to be published whenever new 
securities are issued to the public or admitted to trading
13 and concerning 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).
14 Here the EC has 
introduced a new prohibition, i.e. market abuse, which is much broader in 
scope than insider dealing. Besides insider dealing, market abuse also 
includes disrupting the price fixation of financial instruments and 
disseminating false or misleading information, either online or not. It is 
essential to investors that the rules of play concerning a) access to the 
information; b) awareness as to the price fixation and c) awareness as to the 
source of the public information are the same for all investors and that these 
rules are respected. Because of the increase of trade in financial instruments 
via the Internet and the digital supply of information concerning financial 
instruments this need on the part of investors has only become greater. It is 
required of the Member States that they impose effective, proportionate and 
deterrent administrative measures and sanctions. It is further required that in 
every Member State one independent administrative body is entrusted with 
the supervision and the imposition of administrative sanctions for insider 
dealing and market manipulation. This is without prejudice to a possible 
cumulation with criminal law sanctions. The administrative sanctions also 
                                                           
10  Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field. 
11  Directive 89/592, O.J. L 334. 
12 COM/2002/625. 
13  COM/2001/0280 final, O.J. (2001) C 240E, agreed upon in July 2003. 
14  Directive 2003/6/EG of 28 January 2003.   7
include punitive sanctions in the sense of Article 6 ECHR, such as forfeiture of 
a penalty payment, administrative fines, suspension and cancellation of a 
permit. In short, this is punitive administration at work, under the direction of 
the EC.  
Another new feature is that the Directive requires concrete minimum 
powers of investigation which the supervisor exercises “either directly, or in 
collaboration with other authorities, such as judicial authorities”.
15 That access 
to the accounts and the request for information are part of this is hardly 
surprising, but the list in Article 12(2) also includes: the request for telephone 
and data traffic records, requesting the freezing and/or sequestration of 
assets and requesting a temporary prohibition of professional activity. The 
Directive therefore not only regulates the administrative powers of supervision 
but also in part certain powers of criminal investigation, at least by making it 
obligatory that the administrative enforcement agency can request the 
exercise of these powers before the judicial authorities. Many Member States 
will have to adjust their substantive criminal law provisions on stock market 
fraud, including the related powers of supervision and investigation. The 
Directive moreover provides a mandatory duty of information for traders who 
reasonably suspect that “a transaction might constitute insider dealing or 
market manipulation”.
16 This duty to inform of course strongly resembles the 
duty to inform in the case of suspected money laundering, which is also laid 
down in Community law. This new duty of information must be incorporated in 
national legislation in such a way that it is enforceable. 
The direct harmonisation of punitive administrative sanctions and punitive 
supervision by administrative enforcement bodies is not exceptional in the EC. 
Regulations concerning agriculture and customs and anti-fraud regulations
17 
provide detailed administrative sanctions which the Member States are 
obliged to impose.
18 Whether these powers also allow for the direct 
harmonisation of national criminal and criminal procedural law is a 
controversial topic in the legal literature. The European Commission has 
repeatedly attempted to oblige Member States, through Directives, to 
                                                           
15 Article  12(1). 
16 Article  6(9). 
17  See for instance Regulation No. 2988/95, O.J. (1995) L 312.   8
implement direct measures of criminal law harmonisation,
19 but in practice the 
Council of Ministers has removed the criminal law sting out and has left intact 
the discretion of the Member States with respect to their enforcement 
regimes. Whether this political conclusion also implies that the EC Treaty 
does not include a legal basis for direct harmonisation in the field of criminal 
law remains to be seen, however. Legally speaking, the introduction of the 
third pillar, including that of Amsterdam, did not affect the first pillar and 
therefore did not affect the possible legal basis for direct criminal law 
harmonisation within the first pillar either. In fact, Article 2 of the EU Treaty 
expressly provides that the third pillar must promote and comply with the 
Community  acquis. In short, the powers under the third pillar may not be 
exercised at the expense of the powers under the first pillar and the third pillar 
also serves to enforce Community policy. What is important, however, is that 
in the Amsterdam EC Treaty an express legal basis was laid down for 
harmonisation with a view to protecting the financial interests of the EC and 
for customs cooperation.
20 These two Articles alone provide that measures 
which are taken on the basis of these Articles may not relate to the 
“application of national criminal law or the national administration of justice”. 
Further, the European Commission is of the opinion, and this opinion is 
supported by the European Parliament, that the EC Treaty most certainly 
includes the power to directly harmonise criminal law. For this reason, the 
European Commission has recently submitted two proposals for directives 
which would directly harmonise criminal law. The proposals concern EC 
fraud
21 and environmental criminal law.
22 Both proposals compete with third-
pillar initiatives: the first with the PIF Convention and its protocols
23 and the 
second with the proposal for a framework decision on environmental criminal 
law.
24 It has meanwhile emerged that the Council’s Legal Service has advised 
that the EC Treaty does indeed contain a legal basis for direct criminal law 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 Case  C-240/90,  Germany v. Commission, 1992, ECR p.I-5383. 
19  See proposal for a Council directive on prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering, COM/1990/106 final, O.J. (1990) C 106. 
20  Articles 280 and 135 respectively of the EC Treaty of Amsterdam. 
21  COM/2001/0139 final, C 180E/238. 
22 COM/2001/272 final, C 240E/125. COMTE,  F., “Criminal Environmental Law and Community 
Competence”, European Environmental Law Review, 2003, Volume 12, No. 5, pp.135-147. 
23  O.J. (1995) C 316; O.J. (1996) C 313 and O.J. (1997) C 221. 
24  O.J. (2000) C 39.   9
harmonisation, although this is limited to laying down prohibitions or 
prescriptions (offence descriptions) and the duty to impose penal sanctions. 
The criminal law harmonisation of penalties, of aspects relating to prosecution 
and criminal liability and of cooperation in the field of criminal law can only be 
effected under the third pillar. It is clear that not all Member States support 
this unexpected advice, which recognises a competence for limited criminal 
law harmonisation under the first pillar. The Council of Ministers paid it little 
heed and has meanwhile adopted the framework decision on environmental 
criminal law.
25 This obliges Member States to penalise certain intentional and 
culpable environmental offences and also to provide custodial sentences for 
the more serious ones. As far as I am concerned, the European Commission 
has been right to contest the adoption of the framework decision before the 
Court of Justice for being contrary to the Community acquis. Hopefully this will 
result in the long-awaited decision on the principle concerning the division of 
powers with respect to criminal law harmonisation and put an end to the 
institutional battles between the EC and the EU. 
 
C.  Regulation of National Cooperation and Exchange of 
Information 
 
The cooperation between the national enforcement authorities is also 
regulated within the first pillar and centres around mutual administrative 
assistance.
26 Briefly summarised, this concerns the exchange of information 
between supervisors in the field of customs, taxation
27 and money 
laundering.
28 Investigation upon request, with the participation of foreign 
inspectors, is also possible in the framework of this assistance. In the field of 
customs duties
29 the European Commission is a recognised requesting party. 
                                                           
25  Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003, O.J. L 5 February 2003. 
26  For further analysis see VERVAELE, J.A.E. and KLIP, A. (eds.), European Cooperation between Tax, 
Customs and Judicial Authorities, Deventer, Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
27  Directive 77/799, O.J. (1977) L 336 and Regulation No. 1798/2003, O.J. L 264. See VERVAELE, 
J.A.E. (ed.). Lutte contre la fraude à la TVA dans L’Union européenne, Antwerp-Brussels, Maklu-
Bruylant, 1996. 
28  See Council Decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between 
financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, O.J. (2000) L 
271. 
29 See Council Regulation No. 515/97, O.J. (1997) L 82 on mutual assistance between the 
administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the 
Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters.   10
The Commission can therefore also request the Member States to start an 
investigation and participate in it when asked. That the importance of the 
exchange of information between national enforcement authorities (either 
voluntarily or upon request) in the administrative trajectory is not restricted to 
the establishment of a tax assessment or customs duties arrears was recently 
confirmed in the KB Luxembourg scandal where client information of the 
Luxembourg branch of the Belgian KB bank which had been stolen by an 
employee fell into the hands of the Belgian authorities who passed on this 
information by voluntary assistance to the Dutch and German authorities. 
 
D.  Operational Powers of Enforcement of the European 
Commission 
 
The European Commission has had operational powers of investigation 
and punishment in the field of European competition since the 1960s. These 
powers have their legal basis in Articles 80 and 81 of the EC Treaty and have 
been further elaborated in the historic Regulation No. 17/62.
30 In short, it can 
be said that the European Commission can independently supervise 
companies and third parties, has access to premises and records, can ask 
questions and make copies of invoices, hard disks, etc. The European 
Commission has no powers of criminal investigation or prosecutorial means of 
coercion at its disposal, but in case of non-cooperation it can request the 
assistance of the Member State in question, which has to take all appropriate 
measures. Since the Hoechst case
31 it is generally accepted that this 
assistance may include an inspection of premises, i.e. breaking into storage 
areas, hacking into computer files, etc. This administrative law inspection 
strongly resembles a criminal law search. For this reason, the Commission 
must first apply to a judicial authority for authorisation in a number of Member 
States. Here, too, it has become apparent that the dividing line between 
administrative law supervision and criminal law investigation is beginning to 
fade. Regulation No. 17/62 has recently been replaced by Regulation No. 
                                                           
30  O.J. 13 of 21 February 1962. 
31  Case 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst, 1989, ECR p.2859.   11
1/2003
32 which in Article 21 authorises the European Commission also to 
carry out this inspection of premises in other than business premises, 
including the homes of directors, managers and other staff. This inspection is 
also subject to judicial authorisation.
33 
That the Commission has independent operational powers of supervision is 
exceptional, but in 1996 an important power was nevertheless added, i.e. that 
of the European Commission’s anti-fraud unit OLAF (or UCLAF).
34 OLAF may 
request Member States to start an administrative investigation and have its 
own inspectors participate in this investigation, but under Regulation No. 
2185/96
35 OLAF also has the power to investigate in the Member States 
independently. The Regulation provides for a horizontal arrangement, 
meaning that the provisions apply to all EC policy areas where these have a 
connection with EC finances. The mandate not only covers transnational 
fraud, but also serious fraud and in addition the Commission can carry out 
inspections in special cases to correct a failure to enforce on the part of a 
Member State (the principle of proactive assimilation). Within this mandate, 
OLAF may independently, i.e. on its own authority, but under the responsibility 
of the Commission, carry out outside inspections with teams that may consist 
of inspectors from the Member State concerned and/or from other Member 
States. The powers of investigation are regulated under Article 7 and include 
classic powers of supervision, i.e. not powers of investigation therefore. 
However, also in this case Member States have a duty to assist, which is in 
practice often fulfilled by judicial authorities. In addition, OLAF has internal 
supervision powers at the European institutions in the fight against fraud and 
corruption.
36 OLAF does not therefore have any powers of judicial 
investigation or means of coercion, but the Regulation does provide for direct 
cooperation with the national judicial authorities. The importance of this OLAF 
Regulation has recently been demonstrated in high-profile fraud scandals like 
                                                           
32  O.J. L 4 January 2003. 
33  See the recent cases Colas Est (ECHR) and Roquette Frères (ECJ). Comments in KRANENBORG, 
H.R., “Artikel 8 EVRM en de verificatiebevoegdheden van de Commissie”, Tijdschrift voor Europees 
en Economisch Recht, Sociaal-economische Wetgeving, 2003, pp.49-57. 
34 V ERVAELE, J.A.E., “Towards an Independent European Agency to Fight Fraud and Corruption in the 
EU?”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1999, pp.331-346. 
35 Regulation No. 2185/96 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the 
Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and 
other irregularities, O.J. (1996) L 292.   12
the one at the Eurostat Office
37 and the insider dealing scandal where EC 
public servants allegedly tipped off grain companies concerning the weekly 
grain prices (insider dealing in raw materials). 
 
II  The EU and the Europeanisation of Criminal Law 
 
A. Europeanisation  of  Criminal Law under the Maastricht Treaty 
 
During the 1980s, JHA-related topics were already being discussed at the 
European level. The European Political Cooperation (EPC)
38 and Schengen 
are the appropriate forums for consultation and specific standard setting. The 
EPC treaties and the Schengen acquis
39 are results of this. Nevertheless, at 
the beginning of the 1990s there was clearly a need for a more structural and 
fundamental approach. Integrating JHA in the Community structure and rules 
of play proved to be several steps too far for many countries. The EU pillar 
structure with its mixture of Community and intergovernmental policy emerged 
as the optimum compromise. JHA became a part of the EU structure, 
although in that part the Member States quite clearly ruled the roost and 
different rules applied, like the rule of unanimity in decision making, limited 
powers for the European Parliament and optional jurisdiction for the European 




Upon the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, no one could suspect 
that the Europeanisation of criminal law would be accelerated to the extent 
that it was. Title VI of the EU Treaty
40 made no mention of criminal law 
harmonisation, but of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation. To the extent that there were substantive areas of common 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36  Regulation No. 1073/1999, O.J. (1999) L 136 of 31 May 1999. 
37 See  http://www.uba.uva.nl/jb/object.cfm?objectid=C9E49C83-F015-421D-A1EA8F30619620E9. 
38 V ERVAELE, Fraud against the Community, see supra footnote 4. 
39 The  Schengen  Acquis integrated into the EU, May 1999, Council of the EU. 
40  For more background information see MONAR,  J.  & MORGAN,  R. (eds.), The Third Pillar of the 
European Union, Brussels, College of Europe and European Interuniversity Press, 1994; BIEBER, R. 
& MONAR, J. (eds.), Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union, Brussels, College of Europe   13
interest, these were quite limited and exclusively listed under Article K.1. 
Despite this, in the period between 1993 and 1998 a considerable number of 
JHA activities were carried out which appeared to go outside the mandate of 
Title VI. Especially as regards the non-binding instruments a rather wide 
range of topics may be found in resolutions, recommendations, common 
positions, etc. I refer, for example, to terrorism, money laundering, 
environmental crime, racism, xenophobia, illegal art trade, counterfeiting, 
hooliganism, human trafficking and driving disqualifications.
41 It would be 
difficult to contribute this to the regulatory zeal of the European Commission 
or to reproach the Commission in this respect, as it had no right of initiative 
with respect to these expressly criminal law topics. In short, the need to 
cooperate intergovernmentally in criminal matters was blatantly met and 
increasingly filled in the field of harmonisation of substantive criminal law. It is 
also worth noting that most topics were inspired by national, topical political 
items. 
 
2.  The Regulation of National Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information 
 
In the period 1992-1998 the improved regulation of legal assistance and 
extradition in the EU, which would serve to replace the classic Council of 
Europe instruments, was also progressing, among other things by the 
introduction of simplified extradition with the consent of the suspect.
42 The 
jewel in the crown is undoubtedly the European Mutual Assistance 
Convention which after years of negotiations was adopted in 2000.
43 The 
Convention introduced direct cooperation between the enforcement agencies 
as a principle (instead of the ‘royal route’ via the Ministries of Foreign Affairs) 
and also provides proactive and special prosecutorial investigation 
techniques, like infiltration, controlled delivery and the power to tap phones. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and European Interuniversity Press, 1995 and TULKENS,  F.  & BOSLY,  H.D.,  La justice pénale et 
l’Europe, Brussels, Bruylant, 1996. 
41  See website of the Council for an overview: http://www.consilium.eu.int/jai/default.asp?lang=en. 
42  Convention on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union, 
O.J. (1995) C 078. 
43  Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union, O.J. (2000) C 197. See VERVAELE & KLIP, European Cooperation between Tax, Customs and 
Judicial Authorities, see supra footnote 26.   14
Furthermore, subject to certain conditions, it is also possible to make use of 
the  lex forum, i.e. the law of the requesting state, when implementing a 
request for legal assistance in the requested state. It may, for example, be 
helpful for the use of evidence in the forum to have the suspect’s lawyer 
present in the investigation, even if a provision to this end does not exist in the 
requested state. 
 
3. Operational  Enforcement by the EU 
 
A clear choice was made under the EU of Maastricht in favour of 
supranational enforcement. The most obvious example is the establishment of 
Europol,
44 which has developed from a drug unit into a European police 
organisation with an impressive scope of subject-matter jurisdiction. This is 
the result of the often-used provisions under the Europol Convention, which 
entered into force in 1998, to expand the scope of Europol’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction. By now, offences such as the counterfeiting of euros, international 
fraud, human trafficking, terrorism, etc. also fall within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of Europol. Still, as is a known fact, Europol’s tasks with respect to 
these offences is limited to gathering and enhancing criminal data and using 
these to support the operational activities in the Member States. To this end, 
special databases have been developed within Europol, which also contain 
personal data. In short, Europol is not a police authority carrying out police 
supervision. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the coordination and operationalisation of 
legal assistance and extradition were also improved. In a number of Member 
States, liaison magistrates
45 were posted to the international criminal law 
departments (central authorities) of the Ministries of Justice. An experienced 
French examining magistrate or prosecutor working in The Hague acts as 
liaison between the two countries in case of requests for legal assistance or 
extradition. He knows the law, the practice and customs of both countries and 
has a coordinating function. He does not exercise any independent 
investigative power in the host country. Only a minority of Member States 
                                                           
44  Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), O.J. (1995) C 
316.   15
have effectively introduced this system. Further, a European Judicial Network 
(EJN)
46 was established in Brussels, which operates mainly in the field of 
making the legal assistance instruments accessible to practitioners. 
 
B.  Europeanisation under the Treaty of Amsterdam
47 
 
The negotiations concerning the reform of the third pillar were extremely 
laborious.
48 Major issues, among which the integration of the Schengen 
acquis into the EU,
49 were only resolved at the final summit meeting of 
Government Leaders and Heads of State in Amsterdam. Besides the 
integration of Schengen, the section containing immigration, asylum and visa 
and judicial cooperation in civil matters was transferred to the first pillar
50 and 
the third pillar was substantially reformed. Title VI was transformed into a 
specific title concerning police and judicial cooperation.
51 The Title’s 
objectives are described somewhat vaguely in Article 29: “to provide citizens 
with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice […] 
by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular 
terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug 
trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud”. Instruments to 
achieve these ends are not just police and judicial cooperation as indicated in 
Title VI, but also “approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal 
matters in the Member States”, i.e. direct harmonisation of criminal 
(procedural) law. 
In the EU Treaty of Amsterdam the Commission was also given the right of 
initiative for the third pillar. Quite soon a directorate-general for JHA was 
established
52 under the European Commission and already in December 
                                                                                                                                                                      
45  Joint Action, O.J. (1996) L 105. 
46  Joint Action, O.J. (1998) L 191. 
47  Came into force on 1 May 1999. 
48 See  DE ZWAAN, J., “The Future of the Third Pillar and the Fight against EU Fraud: Evaluation of the 
IGC and the Treaty of Amsterdam”, in VERVAELE,  Transnational Enforcement of the Financial 
Interests of the European Union, see supra footnote 9, pp.13-29. 
49  Implementation Convention, O.J. (2000) L 239. 
50  It should be noted, however, that many of the third pillar rules still apply to this Title IV, such as the 
unanimity rule for the adoption of Regulations and Directives under Title IV. 
51 D E KERCHOVE, G. & WEYEMBERGH, A., Quelles réformes pour l’espace pénal européen?, Bruxelles, 
Université libre de Bruxelles, 2003. 
52  A small task force operated under the EU Treaty of Maastricht. 
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1998 the action plan of the Council and the Commission concerning the 
realisation of the area of freedom, security and justice
53 was adopted. The 
action plan contains a long list of policy priorities with time frames. Concerning 
these, it should in any case be noted that the harmonisation of substantive 
criminal law is not limited to the three paradigms mentioned. The prime 
impulse for the Europeanisation of criminal law, however, came from the 
special European Council of Government Leaders and Heads of State at 
Tampere (October 1999), which was exclusively dedicated to the area of 
freedom, security and justice. The Tampere conclusions
54 pushed to the 
forefront the well-known EC law principle of mutual recognition
55 as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation. Member States must mutually recognise 
each other’s judicial decisions, including those delivered during the 
investigation stage, and give them legal effect without too much ado. The 
underlying thought is that this mutual recognition will eliminate the need for 
extensive and detailed harmonisation of national criminal (procedural) law. It 
is, however, recognised in recital 37 that a certain harmonisation of criminal 
procedural law will be necessary, namely the minimum standards that will 
enable mutual recognition. In the Tampere conclusions the Council and the 
Commission are asked to adopt a programme of measures to implement the 
principle of mutual recognition. It was also expressly requested that in this 
programme attention should be given to a “European Enforcement Order and 
on those aspects of procedural law on which common minimum standards are 
considered necessary in order to facilitate the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition, respecting the fundamental legal principles of Member 
States […]”. The Commission has transposed the conclusions of Tampere in 
a substantive working programme known as the scoreboard,
56 which is 
adjusted every six months and contains an impressive list of policy priorities. 
The Commission has also drawn up a communication concerning mutual 
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recognition of final judgments in criminal cases,
57 a green paper concerning 
the compensation of victims
58 and a green paper concerning the rights of 
suspects and defendants.
59 Finally, these internal dynamics were given extra 
impetus by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the external and 
internal pressure which resulted for EU decision making in the field of JHA. 
There is no doubt that the decision making process concerning the European 
arrest warrant and harmonisation in the field of terrorist offences has been 
considerably accelerated by this, even to the extent that the European Council 
imposed a deadline on the JHA Ministers. Of course, determination in 
decision making is not always synonymous with democracy, constitutionalism 




As opposed to police and judicial cooperation, the harmonisation of criminal 
(procedural) law is not elaborated separately in Title VI. Under the heading 
“judicial cooperation” Article 31e provides for the progressive adoption of 
“measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and 
illicit drug trafficking”. It is worth noting that Article 31e is worded more 
restrictively than the umbrella Article 29. The substantive area is limited to 
three paradigms; criminal procedural law appears to have been exempted 
from harmonisation and the placement of this subsection suggests some kind 
of link with judicial cooperation, such as, for example, the removal of 
obstacles to judicial cooperation. This, however, seems improbable, as Article 
31c already provides for this. Furthermore, the EU Treaty of Amsterdam 
provides a new legal instrument for the specific purpose of harmonisation: the 
framework decision. Framework Decisions still have to be taken on the basis 
of unanimity, but the framework decision need not be ratified by the Member 
States, like the Convention, but does need to be implemented in national law. 
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The framework decision sets a time-limit. This has considerably increased the 
efficacy of third-pillar standard setting, but has also resulted in the fact that 
national democratic supervision of the decision-making process in Brussels 
will from now on only take place during the preparatory stages. All the more 
reason for national parliaments to take a proactive stance vis-à-vis their 
national Ministers. This development has also made the attention and role of 
certain NGOs quite important. Statewatch
60 in the UK, for example, has 
developed into a real watchdog of civil rights and EU policy, including in the 
field of JHA. 
Neither the treaty provisions, nor the principle of mutual recognition have 
prevented the Commission or the Member States from submitting a steady 
flow of proposals for the harmonisation of criminal (procedural) law. Some 
claim the Union has gone overboard in this respect.
61 As opposed to the 
Commission, which is working towards the execution of a consistent 
programme based on the scoreboard, the Member States - including those 
which are in principle unfavourably disposed towards European criminal law - 
are submitting a panoply of proposals.
62 The harmonisation proposals 
concern both substantive and procedural criminal law and penal sanctions. 
The substantive topics are very wide-ranging and do not always show links 
with serious crime; often, they are the product of national political agendas. 
Spain has been very active in the field provisions on terrorism, France in the 
field of financial crime, Belgium in the field of sexual abuse of children, etc. 
The topicality factor is less obvious in the framework decisions which have 
entered into force. Relevant framework decisions are those on the 
counterfeiting of the euro,
63 money laundering
64 and combating terrorism.
65 
This latter framework decision reveals how deeply third-pillar law affects 
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national criminal law, as many Member States did not specifically penalise 
terrorism in the past, but punished such offences as crimes under ordinary 
law, for example the formation of criminal gangs. This harmonisation is not 
limited to the component parts of the crime, but also includes elements of the 
criminal law sentence. The ad hoc approach of minimum maximum sentences 
has come under fire. Proposals have been tabled for discussion that suggest 
using four categories of maximum penalties (extraditable offences, offences 
with a maximum custodial penalty of between 1 and 5 years, between 5 and 
10 years, and more than 10 years). Due to mutual recognition and the 
resulting elaboration of transnational European criminal law harmonisation 
also increasingly involves criminal procedural law. Prime examples of this are 
the framework decision on the execution of orders freezing assets or 
evidence
66 and the proposal for the mutual recognition of fines.
67 
 
2.  Regulation of (National) Cooperation and Exchange of Information 
 
Police and judicial cooperation have been elaborated in Articles 30 and 31 
EU respectively. As regards the regulation of national cooperation there is 
nothing new here. And yet, appearances can be deceptive. Because of the 
interpretation which the Tampere agreement has given to the area of 
freedom, security and justice and how it has made the notion of mutual 
recognition a focal point, the Commission has formulated an elaborate 
programme in the scoreboard of instruments of mutual recognition which are 
to speed up legal assistance, extradition and the execution of criminal 
sentences. In this context and partly under pressure from the 11 September 
attacks the framework decision on a European arrest warrant and surrender 
procedures
68 was established. The importance of this framework decision 
must not be underestimated. Between the Member States, the classic 
extradition procedure is replaced by this warrant. The judicial authorities in the 
requested state automatically execute the warrant. Judicial testing in the 
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requested state is only of a very marginal character, while political authorities 
are no longer involved at all. The requirement of double criminality has been 
dropped for 32 offence descriptions (covering many more offences in 
practice). Surrender takes place within 10 days in case of the consent of the 
person to be surrendered, and within 60 days in all other cases. There are still 
grounds for compulsory and optional refusal, but compared to the classic 
extradition treaties these are very limited. 
With respect to the exchange of information, the integration of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) in the EU is of course of major 
importance, as is the exchange of information in the framework of Europol.
69 
Meanwhile, SIS II and the access of Europol and Eurojust to certain fields of 
SIS II are being actively pursued.
70 However, one still cannot speak of a true 
European Information System (EIS). 
Also of great importance is that Article 28 EU provides a special legal basis 
for the conclusion of agreements in the field of JHA between the EU and third 
countries. It came as no surprise after 11 September that for the first time the 
Council gave permission to the Commission to open negotiations with the 
USA. The USA would have liked to be recognised as the 16th state for the 
purpose of the European arrest warrant. This was not negotiable for most 
Member States, but also the fact that the death penalty can be imposed in 
many states of the USA and at the federal level created a problem, among 
other things because this goes against Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). The negotiations have not been easy, but have still 
resulted in two historic instruments, namely a bilateral extradition treaty and a 
bilateral legal assistance treaty between the EU and the USA.
71 Extradition 
may be refused if there is no guarantee that the death penalty will not be 
carried out. 
 
3.  EU Operational Enforcement 
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Articles 30 and 31 EU mainly emphasise operational aspects, the 
enhancement and exchange of information and developing common 
standards (education, technical equipment, etc.). As regards Europol, the EU 
Treaty still does not provide any operational powers, but by Article 30 does 
create the legal basis for a role for Europol in joint investigation teams. The 
idea is that these teams, consisting of members of enforcement organisations 
from different Member States, could operate in the territory of the participating 
Member States with respect to specific crimes (e.g. human trafficking, drug 
dealing, smuggling of cigarettes or alcohol). A need to cross the boundaries of 
national territory is thus emerging, a fact which had already become clear in 
the Schengen agreements with the regulation of cross-border pursuit. A 
framework decision on these teams has meanwhile been adopted,
72 but the 
participation in the teams of Europol public servants is up to the Member 
States who set them up. The Europol Convention has been amended by a 
protocol
73 which still awaits ratification, but gives Europol public servants the 
power to request the establishment, carrying out or coordination of 
investigation and to take part in joint investigation teams. 
The EU Treaty of Amsterdam does not mention any further European 
operationalisation of judicial cooperation as compared to the EU Treaty of 
Maastricht. Nevertheless, these matters are the subject of political and 
institutional strife within the European institutions. The European Parliament 
and the European Commission have always been quite critical of the 
existence and functioning of the third pillar. They have always defended the 
Community approach. They moreover take the view that third-pillar regulation 
and third-pillar coordination of judicial cooperation are inadequate to deal with 
clear Community interests, such as combating EC fraud. For this reason, at 
their request a model has been drawn up in the Corpus Juris study for a 
European criminal law area with a European Public Prosecutor’s Office and 
judges of freedoms in the Member States.
74 Based on these preliminary 
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studies the European Commission at the IGC while preparing the Nice Treaty 
in 2001 proposed
75 to include an Article 280bis that would provide for the 
appointment of a European Public Prosecutor. The proposal was not adopted 
in Nice, ostensibly due to lack of time and the need to examine practical 
consequences further. However, the Tampere conclusions already provided 
for the establishment of Eurojust with the aims of contributing to a proper 
coordination between the national prosecution authorities and supporting 
investigations in the field of organised crime. It was decided at the IGC to 
incorporate Eurojust in the Treaty. The Eurojust decision
76 has meanwhile 
been approved. It does not give Eurojust any actual operational Public 
Prosecutor’s tasks either. Eurojust can, however, and not unimportantly, play 
a significant coordinating and directing role.
77 It can do this based on Article 6 
acting through the national members or via Article 7 as a College. The power 
is the same, but in Article 7 it has clearly been prescribed with more binding 
force to the Member States. Eurojust as a College can not only request 
information from the Member States, but also, in case of serious crime, 
request that they start an investigation or prosecute, that they attune 
jurisdictions, or set up joint investigation teams. The powers of the national 
members of the College depend on national law. In the Rules of Procedure
78 
Eurojust’s functioning is further defined. However useful Eurojust may be, it is 
clear that with Eurojust the rules of play concerning territorial boundaries and 
powers have not changed significantly. Operational action is taken through 
the national authority, whose powers are defined nationally, rather than at the 
European level. This is therefore quite far removed from the model of a 
European Public Prosecuter’s Office that could take investigative and 
prosecuting action based on a European territorial principle throughout the 
entire European justice area.
79 For this reason, the Commission decided to 
persevere. It published a detailed Green Paper on the protection under 
criminal law of the financial interests of the Community and the appointment 
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of a European Public Prosecutor.
80 The numerous reactions to the Green 
Paper
81 were processed for the negotiations in the European Convention, 
where the European Public Posecuter’s Office was one of the items on the 
agenda. 
 
III  Evaluation and a Look Ahead 
 
The influence of European law and policy on national criminal (procedural) 
law has grown considerably over the past ten years. Especially direct 
harmonisation, the regulation of transnational cooperation and the continued 
development of European enforcement bodies under the third pillar have put 
Europe in the picture for the everyday practice of criminal law. It should be 
noted, though, that all major decision making concerning the outlines of 
European criminal law was initiated by the European Council. Both at the 
special European Council on JHA at Tampere and at the European Council 
after 11 September it was the Government Leaders and Heads of State who 
drew up the agenda and kept the JHA on the ball. Despite the tremendous 
performance of the past ten years there is still discontentment, also within the 
EU. The conflict of powers between the first and the third pillar, especially in 
the field of criminal law, has still not fully crystallised. The ratification process 
of the third pillar is only progressing with difficulty. The framework decision 
solves the problem of ratification, but the question remains whether, and how, 
the Member States will implement the framework decisions in national law. 
Furthermore, in the third pillar, the EU lacks the instruments for the legal 
enforcement of such implementation. Finally, there is disagreement in the 
Council over the quantity and quality of the proposals which the Member 
States submit. The Member States are dissatisfied with the decision-making 
process. The national ministries and parliaments have too little influence on 
decision making in the Council. It is also openly doubted whether the EU has 
exclusive competence in the field of external JHA policy. 
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Of course the European Convention was an excellent and representative 
forum of indirect democracy for sketching the contours of the future European 
JHA policy within the framework of the draft EU Constitution. It has become 
clear from the numerous amendments and discussions that contradicting 
views abounded within the Convention concerning the third pillar, both on 
matters of principle and on technical matters. Despite the many compromises, 
the approved proposals are quite coherent. In part I, concerning the values 
and objectives of the EU, Article 18 postulates a single institutional framework 
with a common set of legal instruments (legislation, framework laws, 
regulations and decisions). Article 22 lays down that decisions of the Council 
of Ministers shall be taken by qualified majority, unless expressly provided 
otherwise. A single institutional framework does not mean, however, that the 
rules of play are necessarily the same everywhere. The pillar structure is thus 
being pulled down. An advantage is that many Community principles, like the 
Community loyalty of Article 10 of the EC Treaty (now included in Article 5(2)) 
and the Commission’s right to start infringement proceedings against the 
Member States before the Court of Justice will also start to apply in JHA 
matters. Article 41 further includes in the underlying principles of the EU the 
concept of mutual recognition and the political monitoring by the national 
parliaments of Europol and Eurojust. Chapter IV of the draft Constitution 
includes the special provisions concerning the area of freedom, security and 
justice. Judicial cooperation rests on two pillars, namely mutual recognition 
and approximation of national legislation with a view to developing European 
minimum rules (Article III-171). This minimum harmonisation may concern the 
admissibility of evidence, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure and 
the rights of victims of crime. For this in fact quite extensive competence of 
mutual recognition and harmonisation of criminal procedural law, decision 
making on the basis of qualified majority and codecision has been provided. If 
the Council wishes to harmonise other specific elements of criminal 
procedure, unanimity is required. Further, Article III-172(1) provides minimum 
rules in the field of substantive criminal law and sanctions and does so for 
particularly serious crime with cross-border dimensions (nature, 
consequences, special need for Community approach). The Article provides 
an exclusive list (terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation   25
of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime 
and organised crime), but this list can be extended by a unanimous decision 
of the Council. The framework laws can be adopted by qualified majority and 
codecision. This has finally increased consistency within the Treaty among 
the objectives of criminal law harmonisation. Finally, and not unimportantly, 
Article III-172b(2) for the first time makes a clear connection between the 
substantive policy areas of the EU and enforcement: “If the approximation of 
criminal legislation proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of 
a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, 
European framework laws may establish minimum rules with regard to the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned”. Here too 
a qualified majority is sufficient. In future, therefore, the criminal law 
enforcement of European rules concerning the environment or the stock 
markets can be included in the same legislation or framework law. Chapter IV 
further defines the tasks of Eurojust and Europol as based on the Treaty. Any 
expansion of the tasks of the European enforcement bodies must be decided 
on the basis of unanimity. Finally, Article III-175 provides a legal basis for the 
expansion of Eurojust into a European Public Prosecutor’s Office with 
European jurisdiction as regards the investigating, prosecuting and bringing to 
justice of perpetrators and accomplices of both EU fraud and serious crime 
affecting more than one Member State. The essence of the Corpus Juris and 
the Green Paper on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office was followed 
here. Subject-matter jurisdiction was, however, and rightly so, extended to 
include cross-border offences and not limited to EC fraud. However, a legal 
basis is just a legal basis. To this end, a European law must be unanimously 
passed with the approval of the EP. It is also crystal clear that double 
sovereignty with double jurisdiction, like in the US, is rejected in favour of 
integrating the European criminal law dimension into the integrated legal 
order. 
The proposals of the European Convention will undoubtedly be subject to 
close inspection at the IGC, but there is still a very good possibility that they 
will emerge reasonably intact. The Member States clearly have other fish to 
fry (the Chair of the Council, the number of commissioners on the   26
Commission, funding, the foreign and security policy, etc.) and have 
apparently accepted that an important part of European criminal law, to the 
extent that it is expressly mentioned in the draft Convention, can be 
established through decision making on the basis of qualified majority and 
codecision of the European Parliament. If necessary, the Council can amend 
the list of criminal law and criminal procedural law issues and the tasks 
assigned to Europol and Eurojust based on a unanimous decision. There is 
no doubt that this could herald a new age in which especially the criminal law 
enforcement of classic Community policy finally acquires shape and 
substance. Whatever the final outcome of the IGC may be, it is crystal clear 
that the Europeanisation of criminal law as we have witnessed it over the past 
ten years is only the beginning. Everything points to increased intensity. It is a 
cause for joy that realisation has finally dawned that mutual recognition 
presupposes the harmonisation of criminal procedural law and that special 
and express attention is paid to the rights of individuals in criminal procedure 
and to legal protection and fundamental rights and that the positions of both 
the European Parliament and the national parliaments and of the Court of 
Justice are also strengthened. If the EU would also become a party to the 
ECHR (Article 7(2) of the draft Constitution) and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights would become binding on the EU, we could also continue work on 
making the tasks of Europol and Eurojust operational. 
Respect for the rule of law and fair trial are, also at the EU level, a condition 
sine qua non for the establishment of judicial law enforcement agencies at EU 
level. This also includes recognising the full jurisdiction of the ECJ in the field 
of fundamental rights and European law enforcement. The ECJ ruling on the 
ne bis in idem principle
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